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Simon Jones 
 
The Future Perfect of the Archive: re-thinking performance in the age of 
third nature 
 
Artists in the Archive has focused upon the many ways in which artists working today are engaging 
with and using the remains of performance, the documents, records, ephemera and residual traces of the 
‘live’ event of performance that make up the diverse media of its archives.  Through a series of 
contributions, made by artists and scholars, the range of case studies has demonstrated how 
performance-makers and live-artists have continued to trouble notions of what constitutes the ‘original’ 
performance, how ‘histories’ of performance are written, and how both the archive and the ‘idea’ of the 
archive are used to inform and inflect practice and make new works.  I want now to look prospectively 
towards the ‘future’ of the archive and offer some speculations on how performance-makers will have 
to come to respond to the fundamental shifts in our everyday use of new technologies.  In part, I want 
to further the argument others have made that artists’ engagement with the archive does not provide 
what the historian seeks – a reflective space in between now and then, which produces versions of what 
could have been and holds them up as ‘equally’, if not ‘more’, significant than the performance itself.  
Distinctively, the artist uses the archive as recursive space, informing what’s to come; and more 
crucially for the future of the archive, offers a decisive resistance to the challenges of new technologies, 
which I describe as ‘third nature’, and the hegemonic cultural and socio-political assemblages, within 
which both technology in general and the archive as fact and idea are embedded.  Using the 
phenomenology of Martin Heidegger, I propose that the artist, by refusing to use up archive-technology 
as (in his terms) ‘resource’, by obliging it to appear as itself, re-minds us of this fundamental difference 
between ourselves as human beings and technology as non-human. 
 
Even though I am driven as an artist-scholar to come to terms with the archive, because of its presence 
in my work, here I do not want to set the practitioner against the historian as I fully appreciate the role 
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history plays in informing and enriching contemporary performance practices – the works at hand and 
yet to be done.  However, I do intend to caution against what I see as the dangers of our archive culture 
inherent in this current phase of techno-capitalism, and in so doing, confront an unhelpful orthodoxy 
about the relation of the archive to practice, which ends up unintentionally colluding in performance’s 
commodification and capitulation to those dangers. 
 
When the noise of mobile phone chat interrupted my understanding of the work before me, and 
numerous cameras obscured my view, my brain simply clamped shut. 
(Helen Cole writing about the DaoDao Festival, Beijing 2004 in Brine and Shu 2005) 
 
These pieces’ [by Qiu Zhijie, Yang Zhichao, Wang Chuyu and Wang Hong] original creative 
acts are so intertwined with their documentary records that we can hardly distinguish when the 
artists’ performances end and their documentations begin. 
(Cheng 2012: 174) 
 
Meiling Cheng’s description of the synchronicity of performance and its documentation echoes Philip 
Auslander’s polemic that the documents of performance themselves perform, that ontologically we 
cannot conceive of the performance without the document, indeed, in a reversal worthy of Derrida, to 
all intents and purposes the document stages the performance, in essence, is the performance: ‘I am 
suggesting that performance documents are not analogous to constatives, but to performatives: in other 
words, the act of documenting an event as a performance is what constitutes it as such.’ (Auslander 
2006: 5, original emphasis). What Cheng sees as a necessary cultural-political tactic to ensure the 
preservation and dissemination of radical live-art in China – its documentation and circulation through 
documents (Cheng 2012: 182), Amelia Jones would understand as the necessary means by which we 
make sense of performance, herself reversing the hierarchy of ‘being there’ over ‘reading’ about it from 
its archival remains: 
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As I know from my own experience of the ‘real’ in general and, in particular, live performances 
in recent years, these often become more meaningful when reappraised in later years; it is hard 
to identify patterns of history while one is embedded in them.  We ‘invent’ these patterns, pulling 
the past together into a manageable picture, retrospectively. 
(Jones 1997: 12) 
 
More about manageability later.  But for the moment, for these writers, performance as an (efficacious) 
art-form is inaugurated in the instance of its documentation.  Whilst it is acknowledged that the 
document cannot capture ‘all’ the performance may have entailed, it nevertheless takes priority, for 
either ontological (Auslander) or ideological (Jones) reasons, over whatever the performance might 
have been.  As far as performance is concerned, there is nothing outside the document.  I would contest 
that Auslander bases his argument on a false conflation of Austinian performatives with performance 
per se as an art-form: in short, to be performative is not the same as to perform; and to perform for the 
camera is not the same as to perform for an audience as each kind of performing produces distinct art-
forms – the photo-work and the performance (see Auslander’s discussion of Acconci’s Photo-Piece, 
2006: 4-6) – a distinction he has more recently acknowledged in discussing performances made 
specifically for experiencing online (see ‘The Liveness of Watching Online: Performance Room’ in 
Wee 2016).  And Jones, in my opinion, fails to consider the overwhelming logocentric force of the 
document when she argues that performances and their records are equally (if differently) informative, 
resulting in a flawed assertion that there is an ‘equal’ role for the historian in interpreting what the artist 
may have been doing (Jones 1997: 12): in short, paraphrasing Orwell, both performances and 
documents may well be equal, but some are more equal than others. 
 
Nevertheless, these arguments about the primacy of documentation over performance as event have 
largely held sway and become the current orthodoxy.  I intend to resist this orthodoxy by focusing on 
the archive as technology: I want to propose a counter-theory that the distinctiveness and efficacy of 
performance as an art-form is not inaugurated in the instant of its documentation and their subsequent 
interpretations by historians.  This misrecognizes performance’s essential relation as being with the 
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archive, resulting in its present being immediately taken up in its future perfect – what it will have been 
to future historians.  It even goes beyond André Lepecki’s idea of ‘the will to archive’ as that which 
identifies ‘in a past work still non-exhausted creative fields of ‘impalpable possibilities’’ (2010: 31), to 
figure performance’s first relation as being with the technological: meaning, its present is immediately 
taken up with that which cannot be conjugated.  By reversing Heidegger’s insightful definition of 
technology, that it is ‘therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. … Technē belongs 
to bringing forth, to poiēsis; it is something poetic,’ (1978: 318) I intend to place performance 
essentially in relation to the archive as technology.  This shifts the argument from ‘liveness’ versus 
record, ‘presence’ versus absence.  I will then go on to speculate about the artists’ role in the future of 
the archive, based on current developments in archiving technologies. 
 
As a performance-maker, my practice over twenty years has been concerned with a repeated return to 
one basic question – why make performance in an increasingly mediatized age?  In this digitized 
environment, what can account for the persistence of performance?  As such there is an inevitable 
relationship to technology, but also to the archive as storehouse of performances past, and practice as 
research in the creating of performances present.  This triangulation, within which performance as an 
art-form and its makers find themselves, is clearly a question of knowledge, more precisely how 
particular kinds of knowledge are produced, captured and disseminated.  So, as a question of first 
principles, what is performance’s claim to specialness amongst art-forms?  It would not be that it is 
time-based or site-specific or contingent upon its participants, since other forms are arguably equally 
dependent upon their eventness.  What performance offers us distinctively is the complexity and 
intensity, the multidimensionality and manifold temporalities of its bundling and intermingling of 
media, all gathered together and expressed by way of fleshes mixing, as Emmanuel Levinas succinctly 
express it: ‘Esse is interesse; essence is interest’ (1998: 4). 
 
Indeed, performance manifests this being in-between (inter-esse) in a particularly intense way, since it 
foregrounds not only its eventness, its happening in that time and in a certain place; but also the manner 
of this mixing of persons, their fleshes and histories, their desires and prospects.  It does this through 
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an intensification not of one particular relation between a material, its expressing by means of a single 
object, and the solitary viewer, as in our relationship to painting; but by compounding the sensations of 
the relation between relations.  One fundamental in-between, that of different kinds of material, each 
with their own means and media, their own middles that meddle each in their own curious ways, is 
compounded furiously in the ‘heat’ of the event with another in-between, that of the gathering of 
persons, each aware of the others as persons each in their own right.  In performance, in putting my self 
into the middle of the event as event, its being both out of and in time, as I generally know it and then 
as I am experiencing it now, entre-temps as Deleuze and Guattari would have it (1994: 158); and its 
being both there and not there, as I generally position my body in space and there being potentially 
anywhere other than there, I put myself forth in a doubled sense: into the midst of various middles 
amongst others.  This set-up and mix draws from Heidegger’s definition of the art-work as essentially 
an event of participation, extended through time by those who engage with it: 
 
Preserving the work means standing within the openness of beings that happens in the work.  This 
‘standing-within’ of preservation, however, is a knowing. […] He who truly knows beings knows 
what he wills to do in the midst of them. […] [T]he essence of Existenz is out-standing standing-
within the essential sunderance of the clearing of beings. 
(Heidegger 1978: 192) 
 
From this putting forth, performance-makers seek out collaborators, working each in their own medium 
and skill-set, each with their own discursivity – the choreographic, textual, sonic, musical, pictorial, 
fleshy.  Each collaborator explicitly explores their own material in their own way, and in so doing 
sustains the open relations between different kinds of material and their composition in the performance: 
this is the out-standing standing-within unique to performance as an art-form (for more on this 
application of Heidegger, see Jones 2012).  In encountering media in which they are not expert, each 
has to cross a void in-between channels of communication in order to collaborate.  This model of 
collaboration produces a kind of speaking without a common language, making these collaborative 
relationships endlessly productive and non-resolvable. Furthermore, to borrow a metaphor from 
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quantum mechanics, they are complementary and compossible in that they produce worlds which 
cannot be equated the one with the other, and would, indeed, contradict one another, were it not that 
they somehow appear to work alongside each other in the ‘same’ space-time of the performance-event 
itself.  In theory they should not work; but in practice, the work works precisely at the point where ‘we’ 
as collaborators cannot: impossible collaboration happens (see Giddens and Jones 2009 for further 
discussion of this idea and, in this volume, Bodies in Flight’s Do the Wild Thing! Redux for a practical 
response to these speculations). 
 
If this being in between the in-betweens is particularly heightened in performance – Derrida did call 
theatre ‘the only art of life’ (1978: 247) in critiquing Artaud’s attempt to put himself outside of 
discourse, then how do I document this experience?  How can I, if to attend to any specific discourse 
or practice would render the event’s plenitude down to a single medium or text?  No, to record in any 
one language, be it choreographic, musical, pictorial, verbal, would collapse the very specificity of the 
event’s non-specificity, puncture the no-where of its now-here, evidenced only by the compulsively 
repeated failure of performance’s documentary remains after the fact.  I can only stalk the realness of 
the performance-event itself by way of metaphor, only approach it indirectly by way of forcing 
transitionings, crossings across from the representativeness of one kind of documentary remains to the 
representativeness of another, moving through one document’s discursive field then phasing into 
another, facing another self then turning to a third.  And in each phase-transition, the specific relation 
to the ‘performance itself’ is occasioned in its own way: it is disclosed as real, since momentarily 
apparent, observable, recognizable, navigable.  This transitioning amongst any work’s archival remains 
is as if I were pulling focus from one plane to another, from foreground to background: a zone of interest 
becoming a place of concern; and I feel this working-across the archive as movement, as a dynamic 
through (irreversible) time – as an event of archiving. 
 
The document pulls focus from the blur of interest in the performance to the hard edge of a definable 
object of attention in the record.  So here, by way of each document, the ‘original’ material’s vagueness, 
which I feel haunting the work or exceeding in potential what the work could have possibly manifested, 
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comes suddenly and always surprisingly into sharp relief.  However, not as if I were experiencing the 
work through one lens alone, but as if suddenly recognizing the concreteness of one specificr material 
rendered all others unintelligible.  Here is the peculiar clarity that strikes me about performance’s 
documentary remains, each a glimpse in their own way that banishes all other remembrances.  Whereas 
in the event of performance ‘itself’, I could say that interest dematerializes to the extent that any 
particular material materializes; and it is only when I sustain the materializing of interest, remain in 
between the betweens of the work, literally un-wording it, utterly un-phrasing it, patently blurring it, 
that interest can be properly opened out as new and progressive couplings of thought-sensations.  This 
tension between sustaining the opening out of interest in the performance-event and the instances of 
clarity realized in performance’s documentary remains becomes the productive catalyst at the heart of 
any encounter between performance-maker and archive. 
 
If not uniquely, then decisively, this opens up questions about how artists work across archives and 
rehearsal spaces that are fundamentally technological, in that they tell us something about our 
relationship to all technologies.  As a performance-maker, I experience two fundamentally different 
memories encountering one another in the archival remains of performances I have made: that of 
embodied practice, the experience of having made work over time; and that of the external record 
irrupting into practice from the outside.  This interpolates what was felt with what could never have 
been felt – the image taken from the point of view I never occupied, the camera’s; or even that of the 
page, since the word written down is never the same one that comes to mind.  This struggle of lived 
memories with external records, the profoundly embodied, what drove the work, with the profoundly 
disembodied, as in – estranged, like something familiar taken from one and put at a distance, 
characterizes the artist’s relation to the archive.  And this relating of two very different kinds of recall-
retrieval produce significant consequences for performance’s use of its archival remains in the age of 
the digitized record, as a kind of externalized memory, which I aim to theorize in this chapter. 
 
For me, there is always a certain relief in being able to step away from the relentless issue of being 
together-alone out-standing-standing-within the work as it is being made.  A relief in temporarily 
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occupying the abstracted perspective of the document, looking from the outside at the quasi-object that 
is now the work at hand.  Indeed, ironically, as Jones points out (1997: 12, quoted above), it may well 
be that only by means of the recording device’s technological capacity, whether that be camera and 
computer or pen and paper, can any performance-maker actually realize their work as object, as 
some(quasi-)thing that can be pointed to and so commented upon.  The relief of being able to separate 
clearly the outside from the inside of the making of the work, disentangling out-standing-standing-
within, can provide this necessary refuge from the interminable issue of being in-between the making 
amongst collaborators.  Temporally, this happens as a kind of rhythmic crossing-across from the 
rehearsal room to the archive, similar to those enacted within the making between media and 
collaborators.  However, this time a transitioning happens from inside to outside that making: a stepping 
away that the artist temporarily makes in order to look askance at the work they have been in the midst 
of.  The gap between these two different perspectives produces a potentiality between two profoundly 
different ways of knowing – insider know-how and critical knowledge.  This potentiality becomes the 
gradient that drives the various crossings-across the artist makes back and forth inside—outside their 
return to and re-use of archives.  It is also why the artist has to make these journeys into the archive 
alone, from their own embodied experience and memories towards these documents, by way of their 
own self and will amongst collaborators, as Tim Etchells remarked about the process of re-rehearsing 
Forced Entertainment’s Bloody Mess (2004) seven years later: 
 
In many ways, the ‘show’, as we are rehearsing it in Toulouse, can only be understood as 
something caught perpetually in between our diverse and at times contradictory memories – what 
the show was, what it became – and the evidence provided by the numerous but not-quite-
authoritative video records of the piece in different stages of rehearsal and presentation. 
(Etchells 2015: 92) 
 
Using the archive in the making provokes a strategy of non-collaboration, designed to explore this 
solitariness: in an impossible dialogue between record and potential by way of memory and technique. 
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Furthermore, if insider know-how is always embodied, an intense bundling together of the experience 
of having made with the making now at hand, it can only be realized by way of specific technological 
assemblages of artist and equipment, techniques and conventions.  Performance has a long history of 
early adoption of technologies, from deus ex machina to arc-light to holograms (see Baugh 2005) – a 
theme I do not have space to develop here.  This fundamental relationship to technology is precisely in 
order to open up and test the relation between the performer’s body as medium, flesh as ur-technology, 
and technology as medium: to explore what it is possible to do, say and feel with such equipment, which 
is as much as to say – what it is to live in between such media.  So, with the same force, the performance-
maker pushes archiving to reveal the limit-case uses of its technology by focusing precisely upon what 
cannot be captured by way of that equipment.  Take the Wooster Group’s ‘version’ of Hamlet (2006) 
which ‘stages’ the film-document of the 1964 televised version of Richard Burton’s stage version of 
the iconic character.  This complex assemblage of film and video technologies was an early method of 
broadcasting theatre on television – a forerunner of today’s streaming of live events into cinemas.  In 
‘re-staging’ the performance by way of its film-video document, shown ‘simultaneously’ as part of the 
new version, the Wooster Group used each framing to disclose different representative regimes, a 
relation of actual and virtual bodies and images, within which differences and similarities of 
performance mode constantly tessellated and interpolated the one with the others across a variety media.  
Each had its own discursivity, spatiality and temporality, but all were experienced together by the 
auditor-spectator, whose attention flickered between the fleshiness of ‘live’ actors with their impossible 
task of ‘reproducing’ the (superhuman) screen-performances and the record’s (inhuman) camera 
movements.  Jones’s two modes of experiencing slipped and slid alongside one another – ‘watching’ 
the performance and ‘viewing’ the video (1997: 11) in an out-standing standing-within that precisely 
opened up that space outside the document but inside the performing.  This space was where the non-
human of the technological assemblage could be felt.  Indeed and in action, here the impossible inherent 
in all technology, that which exceeds the human, was staged: a kind of science fiction which, in its 
logic, proposed the as-yet-unrealized future potential of that equipment.  In the case of Hamlet, this was 
the ‘streaming’ experience of the ‘live show’ which, in its future perfect(ion), threatens to re-place going 
to the performance itself.  At first, as in the Wooster Group’s performance, this proposition is always 
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experienced as fundamentally uncanny, actualized in performance as the now-here no-where between 
Being (human) and the impossible (non-human) techno-archive. 
 
The Wooster Group’s strategy of incorporating the archive into the work suggests that, for a document 
of performance to work, it must be forced to fail entirely and completely on its own terms.  For instance, 
it makes sense when documenting a performance with video to use multiple camera and microphone 
positions, to take advice from the camera-operator as regards what we should be looking at, to reshoot 
what they missed, to alter the theatrical lighting to accommodate the camera’s sensitivity, to select shots 
in post-production and re-mix the sound.  The archival document, whether audio-video, written-word 
or blog, is just such a device, which the performance-maker exposes for what it cannot do in comparison 
to the performance itself or the performers themselves.  The partiality of each technological approach 
is necessarily disclosed, and in doing so reveals the gaps inherent within and between all media, 
however ‘naturally’ they have been embodied.  In this way, each (non-)collaborator within any 
performance can only express in their own medium an aspect of ‘the’ work in its totality, which exists 
somewhere in between the photographs and video-screens, the printed page and dancers’ moves: each 
‘document’ necessarily pointing beyond itself towards its lost ‘object’ – the ‘life’ of the performance. 
 
Therefore, the use of whatever recording technology, its techniques and skillset, inevitably provokes 
the performance-maker to go beyond what can be captured or known about performance, overflowing 
form and realizing in each document a failure to do it all and say it all (see Reason 2006 for a 
comprehensive account of different forms of documentation; and Anderson 2015 for a compelling study 
of photography’s relation to theatre).  So that, despite all its craft and ingenuity, we, as both artists and 
audiences, still feel we need to look beyond what the document as artefact tells us about the quasi-
object of performance it has realized in front of us.  I believe this is why performance persists in a digital 
age: it is in an evolutionary race with technologies’ zeal to capture and its processes of commodification, 
always running ahead of each new platform’s claim to higher resolution and greater fidelity, towards 
that innovation’s inadequacy in the face of performer as flesh, performance as event, as experienced, as 
lived.  The current issue for performance-makers is that performance must now work amongst the 
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readiness-to-hand of smart technology, which has foregrounded our relation to the archive in its step-
change capacity to capture and replay ever greater instances of our lives, what I will now go on to define 
as ‘third nature’. 
 
I have argued that if an artist is genuinely open to collaborating with others working in different media, 
this inevitably leads to a deconstructive practice wherein that which each media cannot express 
effectively discloses the discontinuity in our everyday perception (see Giddens and Jones 2013).  These 
‘gaps’ are normally masked by the brain’s desire to produce a continuous account (one might say – a 
fiction) of our being in the world; whereas, in fact, so much of how we experience is learnt through a 
combination of physical development and acculturation: in effect, what we inherit from the genome – 
our first nature, encountering what we acquire through interacting with the world – our second nature.  
Here, I understand ‘nature’ to be a general process whereby the individual acquires knowledge and 
techniques through establishing behaviours that are reinforced by exchanging information with the 
outside environment in ever more predictable circuits of feedback.  Firstly, the child’s own body is its 
environment, and instinctive, inherited systems encourage the learning of how to coordinate hand to 
mouth, to see, to walk and talk.  Secondly, the world enlarges to include multifarious objects beyond 
what is simply ‘there’, and techniques develop which involve the body interacting with specific 
technologies external to the body, such as the bicycle or pen, mobile or PC.  In each of these natures 
and in every acquisition, the first encounter is always profoundly disturbing: the knowledge always 
appears first as nonsense or the technique as ungraspable.  Then we ‘master’ it; the trick is embodied; 
what was outside becomes part of the inside of being to such an extent that its strangeness is forgotten; 
it becomes as one with us: we incorporate the new knowledge or technique as second-nature.  Here, 
performance as an essentially mixed-media art-form has the potential to intervene in this general 
processing of how we acquire knowledge by using those very senses and technologies, upon which our 
techniques are grounded, against themselves, to reveal them as fundamentally strange.  I called this 
deconstructive potential in performance – de-second-naturing (see Giddens and Jones 2009). 
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I want now to suggest that we are living through a profound transformation for the human which many 
scholars have described as the ‘post-human’ (see Braidotti 2013 and Hayles 1999 amongst others); but 
which I think is better understood as third nature.  This paradigm shift in the human-event is occasioned 
by the development of complex, integrated and networked technologies, assemblages of robotic and 
digital machines, which have in effect wholly externalized what previously – in the realm of second 
nature – was experienced as the relation between embodied and disembodied knowledges.  Firstly, 
robots do more accurately and enduringly what humans do; secondly, computers ‘think’ faster and more 
comprehensively than humans think; finally, digital archives ‘remember’ all that we have forgotten.  Of 
course, my anthropomorphization masks the actual non-congruence of these technological assemblages 
in the same way second-naturing internalizes the fundamental strangeness of older technologies, their 
non-humanness.  All technologies extend the capacity of the human, so second nature is already a move 
towards the non-(or post-)human, or rather, a troubling of the very notion of what it means to be human, 
as Steven Mulhall wrote of Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein as a being whose being is an issue for it 
(1996: 14).  What marks third nature as paradigmatic is the ubiquity and capacity of these techno-
assemblages to store, exchange and correlate data.  Through their ever-readiness-to-hand, their locative 
and interactive capacities, the so-called smart technologies of handheld devices, networked to big-data 
cloud-technology, have shifted the everyday ways in which we acquire and use knowledges and 
techniques.  Not only do they offer us the experience of a ready-to-hand ‘augmented’ reality, but also 
their apparent ‘instantaneous’ ‘reply’ embeds the illusion of immediacy, that is, a knowledge apparently 
without a channel of communication – literally a new kind of ‘embodied’ knowing. 
 
It is possible to trace the impact of third nature across a range of fields.  Social media has been assessed 
as reshaping how individuals relate to their families, peer groups and the wider society, generating a 
new kind of politics alongside a ‘post-truth’ hystericization of public debate: for example, see Marc 
Prensky’s highly influential idea of the ‘digital native’, someone under thirty years old, born into a 
world of personal computers and smart devices (Prensky 2001).  The increased interest in memory 
studies has been ascribed to profound transformations in individuals’ relationship to the polis, the crisis 
in history emerging from postmodernism and the geopolitical forces of late capitalism: for example, 
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illuminating studies by Joanne Garde-Hansen (2011), Nancy van House and Elizabeth Churchill (2008), 
Motti Neiger, Oren Meyers and Eyal Zanberg (2011) analyse the emerging relationship between 
personal, social and political forces with new media and its technologies, variously describing ‘media 
memory’, the impact of ‘contextual computing’, and the ‘tangibility’ of memory located in the handheld 
device.  As online archives store ever greater amounts of data, emails, images, videos of individuals’ 
lives (see Katie Day Good’s locating of Facebook in a history of personal archives – 2012, or Emily 
Keightley and Michael Pickering’s comparison of analogue and digital photography – 2014), so the 
anxiety around memory grows, including not only the fear of dementia, but also the acts of 
remembrance of culturally and politically significant events – ‘the history of a people’: see Andreas 
Huyssen’s (1995) and Alison Landsberg’s (2004) compelling studies on the socio-political impacts of 
the techno-archive as producing ‘prosthetic memories’ and ‘cultures of amnesia’, or Anna Reading’s 
critique of ‘globital memory’ (2014). 
 
We could even say, in reference to Foucault’s provocative history of the modern period (1979), that 
‘memory’, however constructed and retrieved, has replaced sexuality as the primary aspect of individual 
identity: see Kerwin Lee Klein’s critique of memory as a ‘therapeutic alternative to historical discourse’ 
(2000: 145).  Scholars have speculated on the evolutionary effect ‘big data’ may have on the brain’s 
capacity to remember, more specifically, what happens to forgetfulness, the brain’s way of sorting 
useful information and avoiding the clutter of ‘useless’ memories, when everything we need to know is 
stored externally and there is no longer an evolutionary driver to remember: ‘With such an abundance 
of cheap [online] storage, it is simply no longer economical to even decide whether to remember or 
forget.’ (Mayer-Schönberger 2011: 68, my emphasis). Victor Mayer-Schönberger calls for 
forgetfulness as a resistance to the techno-archive: ‘As we forget, we regain the freedom to generalize, 
conceptualize, and most importantly to act’ (2011: 118, my emphasis, more of this later).  From the 
perspective of this paradigmatic anxiety, the increasing ‘live streaming’ of performances into cinemas 
and the increased use of online digital repositories for video documentation of shows, alongside the 
disciplinary contention between liveness and presence, look like performance studies’ own version of 
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this techno-fear: see Mark Poster’s grim analysis – ‘The everyday life emerging in information society 
is a battleground over the nature of human identity’ (2006: 230). 
 
From a phenomenological as well as political perspective, the externalization of these ‘memories’ in 
‘big data’ archives, fulfils what Heidegger had predicted in the 1930s would be ‘The Completion of 
Modernity’.  This would be achieved when human life was rendered into that which is producible, that 
is, reproducible, representable, commodifiable, exchangeable.  In Mindfulness (2006), Heidegger first 
makes the link to technology: ‘The rational animal has become subject and has developed reason into 
‘history’, whose sway coincides with the sway of technicity’ (2006: 21).  Then he redefines ‘Art in the 
Epoch of Completeness of Modernity’ as that which leads to the producible: ‘[I]n its pleasantness, art 
is an unconditionally organized delivery of makability of beings unto machination,’ (2006: 23) where 
‘Machination means the accordance of everything with producibility, indeed in such a way that the 
unceasing, unconditioned reckoning of everything is pre-directed’ (2006: 12).  So, for Heidegger, art’s 
out-standing standing-within, its ability to actualize the issue/s of Being, will be replaced by a super-
objective, already determined in advance, to render everything in life as representable, thence 
commodifiable: 
 
What art brings forth is […] not works in being-historical sense that inaugurate a clearing of be-
ing – the be-ing in which beings first have to be grounded.  What art brings forth are ‘installations’ 
(form of organizing beings): ‘poems’ are ‘declarations’; they are ‘appeals’ in the sense of calling 
out what already exists in the domain of the all-directing and all-securing public.  Word, sound 
and image means for structuring, stirring, rousing and assembling masses, in short, they are 
means of organizing. 
(Heidegger 2006: 23-4, original emphasis) 
 
For Heidegger, this strips art of its decisive function: this producibility of images would inevitably lead 
to art which   
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no longer search[es] ‘behind’ or ‘above’ beings, not even feeling ‘emptiness’, but searching and 
finding exclusively and maximally, what in the enactment of the machinational is ‘liveable’, and 
as such can be incorporated into one’s ‘own’ ‘life’ – which is shaped by the masses – and thus to 
foster this as what is solely valid and assuring. 
(Heidegger 2006: 26) 
 
So much so, that ‘Sharing the sway of technicity and ‘history’, art undertakes the organizing of beings 
whose being is decided upon in advance as machination’ (2006: 27). The authenticity of each person’s 
life is lost in the exchange of images of ‘living’, a bucket-list of ‘experiences’ that are subject to the 
‘experience economy’ of current techno-capitalism.  Heidegger predicted that the fundamental inter-
relation of technology, capital and self in the modern age, what I would call this techno-capital 
assemblage, would pose a profound threat to the individual’s capacity to (in everyday words) ‘be 
her/himself’: 
 
Metaphysically, the sway of ‘culture’ is the same as the sway of ‘technicity’.  Culture is the 
technicity of ‘history’ – culture is the manner in which ‘historical’ reckoning with values and 
‘historical’ production of goods arrange themselves and so spread the forgottenness of being. 
(Heidegger 2006: 147) 
 
The embodied memory of experiencing life disappears into the techno-archive’s data, images, texts, 
recordings.  These external quasi-objects appear to be prompts to memory (in the Proustian sense), but 
actually repress remembering in favour of reviewing, recalling in favour of retrieving, always images 
taken by means of the technology and from its point of view – a position no person ever occupied.  
Consider the ‘selfie’ as the ultimate personal archive: the self, seen from the point of view s/he could 
never occupy her/himself, that of the equipment.  But not that of the Other, in Levinas’s sense of the 
person whose otherness calls forth one’s own humanity: the selfie de-selves the self into a non-human 
thingness, that which can be re-presented rather than felt.  In Heidegger’s terms, this set-up ‘organizes’ 
or ‘pre-directs’ us to see our self as these lifeless images: we ‘perform’ them.  The apparently instant 
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retrieval of the image appears to behave like a mirror, as if we were in the same time with our image: 
however, this image appears out of the techno-archive in an entirely different time, discontinuous with 
our own: the one thing the selfie cannot be is an image of the self.  We repress this strangeness and 
uncanniness in our second-naturing of this techno-assemblage – smart device—selfie-stick—cloud-
archive.  Or rather, a terrible reversal of Heidegger’s ontology of technology, whereby, instead of 
second-naturing the technology we use, our nature disappears into ‘its’ uses of us: the techno-archive, 
in ‘remembering’ us, ‘forgets’ our distinctive Being. 
 
This echoes the materialist analysis of Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle in its coupling of 
technology, mass production and cultural behaviour to forces of deathliness: 
 
The spectacle in its generality is a concrete inversion of life, and, as such, the autonomous 
movement of non-life. […] The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social 
relationship between people that is mediated by images. 
(Debord 1995: 12) 
 
However, he did not predict that most of these images would be generated by individuals themselves, 
rather than cultural corporations and governing groups.  The platform, enabling uploading and sharing 
of data, has become dominant over the channels or organizations, generating wealth for its owners 
indirectly through associated advertising and not directly through sales.  ‘Pro-suming’ has replaced the 
Marxist horror of the (pacified and passive) consumer: see David Beer and Roger Burrow’s 
comprehensive exploration of play and ‘prosumption’ in techno-archives (2013).  So much so that the 
techno-archive irrupts into the making of an artwork, re-places re-membering, e-rases it through a 
foundational superimposition.  In the facility with which the archi-byte is accessed and shared, the play 
between the actual and the possible, which has hitherto been the essential dynamic at work in the 
rehearsal room, is literally overwritten (e-rased): the archi-byte renders everything down to one field of 
discursivity, that of the document, or at best the negotiation between documents – the photograph versus 
the video.  All becomes a question of ‘organization’, as Heidegger disparagingly labels art at the 
  292 
completion of modernity.  Furthermore, the archi-byte is disentangled from the instant of its capture 
and endlessly replayed, paused, put into reverse, taken out of the flow of making.  This desynchronicity 
brings the after-the-event-ness of the critical perspective into the making: the time of the historian 
interferes with the artist’s time.  I might say – the archi-byte’s ‘manageability’ suppresses all other 
questions; and the interminable narrativizing of one version of events set against another becomes the 
‘point’ of the work, to which endlessly variable intelligibility the artist must be enslaved.  In short, in 
third nature, the time of the historian supplants the time of making: Hal Foster has figured this as ‘the 
archival impulse’ of contemporary art, what he sees as ‘the will to connect’ (2004: 21).  So, the 
autonomy of everyday lives is surrendered to ‘smart technology’ and ‘big data’ that feeds back to us 
our ‘likes’ and ‘preferences’, and historicizes our lives as ‘time-lines’. 
 
What then can performance as an art do amongst these techno-archives?  How is it to respond to this 
third nature?  In countering these hegemonic and deadening forces, I want to suggest that performance-
makers’ use of such archiving technologies can constitute a decisive resistance to these cultural and 
socio-economic assemblages.  Because the performance-maker’s relationship to the archive must 
expose the partialities inherent in each technological assemblage, it is essentially one of de-second-
naturing.  This mirrors their working across and in between both collaborators and each other’s media 
in the making of the performance itself.  The same fundamental approach carries over into the archive: 
archive-technology is incorporated into the working relations as if it were another collaborator.  As 
such, it remains somehow outside, here somehow itself resistant to co-option, even as it elsewhere 
insinuates itself into our everyday lives apparently so ‘naturally’.  In this sense, the presence of the 
archi-byte in the making of a new work potentially works away at the gaps and aporia already in between 
the collaborators and their media, skillsets and technologies.  The archive itself in its materiality adds 
an additional dimension to the forcing open of these media in the collaborative encounter, opening out 
the new work’s out-standing-standing-within.  It obliges a more explicit non-collaboration to happen – 
a non-collaboration that I have argued elsewhere emerges at the generative core, or better still – the in-
between, of all collaboration in performance-making.  This particular forcing of the archive and its 
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technologies in relation to the artist in amongst the making of performance echoes Heidegger’s 
description of the difference between our everyday use of technology and its use in any art-work: 
 
The more handy a piece of [everyday] equipment is, the more inconspicuous it remains. […] 
[However,] the more essentially the [art]work opens itself, the more luminous becomes the 
uniqueness of the fact that it is rather than not.  The more essentially this thrust comes into the open 
region, the more strange and solitary the work becomes.   
(Heidegger 1978, 190-1) 
 
So, the art-work refuses to use up the archive-technology as resource, as we do our smartphones and 
cloud storage, by obliging it to appear as itself as non-human assemblage, as non-Being.  In this way, 
the artist has the means to re-mind us of the fundamental gap between ourselves as beings and 
technology as equipment.  Otherwise we would disappear in our everyday use into the archive-
technology as it would disappear into us: we would not know where we ended and it began.  The proof 
of the archive would replace the life of the event, and so, by extension, all those who participated in 
that event: ‘I know I was there because the images are on Facebook.’ 
 
As with so many aspects of modernity and its completion, Samuel Beckett’s work insightfully actualizes 
in performance this aporia-agora: consider Krapp’s Last Tape (1958) with its eponymous anti-hero 
sitting in his pool of light, bent over his tape-machine listening to recordings of his ‘younger self’.  The 
first line of the stage direction, which is not alluded to in the following dialogue between voice and 
recording, is – ‘A late evening in the future.’ (Beckett 1973: 9)  It is as if Beckett understood the 
consequences of this then new recording technology, the impact it would have upon our ontology of 
Being, as well as how the theatre can actualize this uncomfortable and addictive slippage between 
embodied recollection and archival retrieval: between memory and recording technologies: for instance, 
Krapp’s delight in the word ‘Spool’ (1973: 10); or his desire, having heard ‘that stupid bastard [he] took 
[him]self for thirty years ago’ (1973: 17) describe a sexual encounter, to ‘be again in the dingle!’ (1973: 
19) And all this played by a 36-year old actor (Patrick Magee, born 1922, in the original 1958 
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production) pretending to be Krapp in his seventies listening to his thirty-something self.  It is as if the 
performance were able to ‘ravel up the time’ of Krapp’s life by confusing what we see on stage before 
us – a pretence of the ageing body, with what we hear on the tape - the actor speaking in his ‘own’ 
youthful voice.  This places us in what Marcyrose Chvasta might well have described as ‘a site of 
virtualization, constituted by potentiality and heterogensis’ (2005: 167), theatre as virtualization 
machine, running ahead of the technology to its limit-case. 
 
What Krapp’s situation offers us is the experience of living as one records: we see Krapp perform a 
version of himself for the benefit of the tape-recorder: his topic is a commentary on his ‘younger self’: 
his ‘life’ has become the process of archiving his life.  This differs significantly from the Listener in 
Ohio Impromptu (Beckett 1982) who has read to him an account of one listening to an account of his 
life: here, we cannot be certain that the prose recounts his life because we do not see him write it.  It is 
not possible to write down the experience as it happens: the scriptural technology requires one step 
aside, sit down and write.  However, Krapp with his tape-recorder is the equivalent of the modern tourist 
who views the places she visits through the screen of her smart device; or the concert-goer who holds 
his camera-phone aloft and peers at the stage by way of its tiny screen (one step further removed than 
Auslander envisaged in his encomium to mediatization: see Liveness, chapter 3); or more politically in 
public-order incidents, the camera-on-camera contentions of differing perspectives, police-officer—
demonstrator; or more pertinently to this discussion, the ‘streaming’ of theatre performances in cinemas.  
In all of these cases, projective looking – how we experience any event happening before us – is reduced 
to viewing the screen’s two-dimensional plane.  I am drawn into these ‘performances’ as would a 
historian, deliberating between two documents, determining the truth as a variable between contesting 
data-sets.  Here, life is replaced by the archi-byte; modernity is completed in the process of uploading 
the archive.  This is because in Heidegger’s terms the experience is reduced to that which is 
representable (the data-file).  In rendering what I am experiencing as a record, its temporality is removed 
from the dynamic flow of living: it is, in effect, already done, already deadly.  And in the uploading, 
life is produced as ‘an experience’ that will have been lived in the future perfect of the archive: the now 
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is taken out of ‘my’ time, ‘anyone’s’ embodied time, and becomes the only possible future through its 
‘production’ as archive. 
 
However, in Krapp’s situation, Beckett leaves me suspended between recordings as if life were this 
silence in between, the blank between pictures, the affect the techno-archive cannot ‘(re)produce’.  He 
demonstrates that a response to the deadly logic of third nature only becomes possible in the 
deconstructive turn of opening up the space-time between archiving and the archive, between the 
making of the record and its production as record: take, for instance, Krapp’s falling into a reverie as 
the tape-machine ‘records’ the silence; or the reverse, of Krapp launching into a prepared account before 
realizing that the machine is not switched on; and then, hearing the ‘younger’ voice on the tape, sitting 
listening all together in the theatre – performer, character, recording, auditor-spectator.  This goes 
beyond Rebecca Schneider’s recuperation of the archive for performance where she ‘resituates’ 
knowing as ‘body-to-body transmission’, because her resistance is still predicated upon ‘reading […] 
the document as performative act, and as site of performance’ (2001: 105).  Beckett shows archiving in 
process alongside the archival as product: the capabilities and limitations specific to each are made 
apparent in their being actualized before us.  Witnessing this process discloses an ethically 
indeterminate out-standing-standing-within in which all participants, Krapp—performer and auditor-
spectators alike, can find delight or disturbance in the uncanny slippages between making the archi-
byte and interpreting it, between one’s embodied perception of the action (Krapp speaking) and what 
the document (tape) records.  Within this archiving as event, we experience process and product as an 
undecidable in between thing and action, noun and verb. 
 
Furthermore, this undecidedness is felt most keenly at the point the Krapp—performer decides to act 
(record).  Here, performance as event as art-form interferes with or queers the archive’s partiality, the 
very thing which Jones among other historians identifies as the engine of its endless productivity of 
histories (see Jones 1997: 12), and goes beyond the mere ‘organizing’ of differing versions of reading 
the archi-byte, the what-ifs of writing a history.  This act of deciding forces each archi-byte to appear 
in its material incompleteness, its solitariness, its inability to realize what is not within its purview, to 
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capture ‘it all’.  So by participating in this decisiveness, each encounters the material’s singularity 
disclosed there-then, as opposed to its producibility and exchangeability: in effect, we recognize human 
agency – a will at work.  Heidegger attaches a crucial importance to this ‘will’ in resisting the fall into 
producibility and in expressing the individual’s most authentic relation to her/his life: 
 
[T]he will to foundational knowing-awareness […] [T]he ‘will’ ‘unto’ be-ing does not turn be-
ing into an ‘object’ of striving so as to grasp be-ing representationally-expanatorily and to set be-
ing aside as a possession.  This ‘will’ is the will to be-ing, en-owned by be-ing itself unto what 
is ownmost to this will. 
(Heidegger 2006: 52) 
 
It is as if each archi-byte awaits the Krapp—performer’s decisiveness to bring it ‘to life’, to ‘un-render’ 
it, to give ‘voice’ to its sounds or ‘flesh’ to its images – Krapp’s hand on the tape-machine’s controls.  
And in acting in relation to the archi-byte, ‘he’ reminds us of our agency, re-sensitizes us to our own 
unique relation to the archive, actualizes how performance both reveals and overcomes the deadliness 
of the archive, in which everything will have been documented.  The performer’s decisiveness (will) is 
a call the performance-event obliges us to answer: we must take a stand in relation to the archive: and 
counter-intuitively, despite Krapp’s endless night of documenting, we are empowered to redeem life 
from the ‘representable’ and experience from economy.  Here, I am echoing Matthew Causey’s plea for 
a deconstructive turn in performance to confront the hegemonic forces of the technologies of the virtual: 
 
If the theatre hopes to resist […], it will have to be able to confront the field of the virtual, not 
through essentialized constructions of failed subjectivities and antiquated technologies, but rather 
through a strategic manipulation of the virtual, turning the system against itself. 
(Causey 2006: 123) 
 
I have proposed that performance, because it is ‘the only art of life’, is an art-form capable of resisting 
the third nature of humanity when all knowledge will be externalized in massive, integrated techno-
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archives, achieving what Heidegger predicted would be the completion of modernity and the 
enslavement of individuals to the technologies they have created, the ‘bare life’ of ‘experiences’, ‘life 
styles’ and ‘time-lines’, the fundamental conjugation of which is the future perfect when life cannot be 
lived because it will already have been lived in the data yet to be archived.  Performance’s relationship 
to the archive and its documents cannot be other than an essentially technological one, a relationship to 
techne, technique and knowledge.  So, the artist’s relation to the archive, thence to all technologies, 
says something more about performance: that at its heart performance embodies knowing because its 
very performing is an issue for it.  The relations disclosed in the performing, including those between 
its liveliness and its recordability as evidenced in the archive, the materializing of the in-between of in-
betweens, the relation of relations, are what matters to performance, in the same way that Heidegger’s 
Dasein is a being whose being is an issue for it.  Indeed, this need or obligation to return to the archive 
is also a return to what it is that constitutes the performance or act or gesture as art.  This recursiveness 
drives every performance tradition as it is itself driven by the crossings across between its making and 
its archiving in and amongst fleshes: every new generation of performers who must go back to those 
foundations, or rather, must re-build those foundations as if for the first time and now amongst the 
techno-archives of our third nature.  Hence performance’s challenge to knowledge as a progressive 
accumulation of data-sets, objects and reproducible procedures leading towards a ‘better’, (so say) more 
‘productive’, future; and also performance’s fundamental relationship to its archives – as perpetual 
reinvention in the promise of what’s to come. 
 
Perhaps the point in any case is that repetition is never enough.  You need to inhabit the structure, 
breathe differently in it; breathe a second time.  You need to know it in order to forget it 
(partially). […] You need to know and unknow. 
(Etchells 2015: 93) 
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